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As You Like It:
Exploring the Limits of Parental Choice in
Assisted Reproduction
Debora L. Spart
In January of 2009, a California woman gave birth to
octuplets, six boys and two girls, each weighing in at less than
three and a half pounds.1 The woman, whose pregnancy was
conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF), was single,
unemployed, and already a mother to six children, all under the
age of eight. 2
Several years earlier, a woman in East Sussex, England
chose to become pregnant at sixty-two.3 Earlier in her life, she
had given birth to and raised three children, but she had
subsequently married another man and wanted to have a child
with him.4 Like the California mother, she too underwent TVF,
employing the services of Severino Antinori, 5  an Italian
embryologist who specialized in helping older women become
pregnant. 6
Meanwhile, prospective parents across the United States and
the world are turning increasingly to preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD),7 an awe-inspiring technique that enables them to
determine at the eight-cell stage which of their IVF-conceived
t. President, Barnard College, and author, most recently, of THE BABY
BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF
CONCEPTION (2006). President Spar wrote this speech, and Professor Goodwin
delivered it verbatim on April 10, 2009 as the Keynote Address at Contested
Contours in Assisted Reproduction: Interrogating Law, Race, Class, & Sex, a
Symposium hosted by Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice.
1. Randal C. Archibold, Octuplets, 6 Siblings, and Many Questions, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at A14.
2. Id.





6. See William E. Schmidt, Birth to 59-Year-Old Briton Raises Ethical Storm,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at A6.
7. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 99-101 (2006).
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embryos carry certain genetic profiles. s Using PGD, parents who
suspect their offspring to be at risk for such deadly illnesses as
Tay-Sachs disease, Huntington's chorea, or sickle-cell anemia can
now screen for the underlying mutations prior to pregnancy,
implanting only those embryos that are free of the particular
defect. 9 In the United Kingdom, fertility clinics are authorized to
screen for more than sixty genetic markers, including those for
breast cancer (BRCA 1), cystic fibrosis, and early onset
Alzheimer's disease.10  In the United States, the Fertility
Institutes, a private fertility clinic with centers in Los Angeles,
New York, and Mexico, openly advertises its sex selection service
on their website, listing a fee of $18,490, with a "slightly higher"
price in New York." As scientists unlock the secrets of the human
genome, the range of possible selection is almost certain to
explode. One start-up company in Palo Alto, for example, has
recently developed a "Universal Mendelian Screen," a single chip
test that will allow any individual to identify his or her genetic
risk and then take steps-IVF, PGD, sperm, or egg donation-to
remove that risk from his or her child. 12
What binds all of these developments together-and indeed
what characterizes the entire advance of reproductive science-is
the widening ability of would-be parents to control the means of
conception; to determine, not only if they will have children, but
increasingly when, how, and by whom. Parents can now select a
boy or a girl; blue eyes or brown; to reproduce as a couple or on
their own. With over 54,000 children born in 2006 from IVF
alone, 13 including over 7,000 from donated eggs,' 4 reproduction
has become not only a matter of will, but also, increasingly, of
selection.
But what does choice actually provide in the context of
reproduction? And how far do its limits extend?
In the traditional discourse, or at least the discourse of a
8. Id. at 63.
9. Id. at 63, 99, 115.
10. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, Examples of Licensed PGD
Conditions, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/PGD-listl.pdf (on file with author).
11. The Fertility Institutes, Procedure Fees,
http://www.fertility-docs.comfertility-fees.phtml#fees-list (last visited Mar. 27,
2009).
12. Interview with Anonymous Start-Up Company, in New York, N.Y. (Jan.
2009).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUmAN SERV., 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 11 (2008), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2O06/508pdf/2OO6ART.pdf.
14. Id. at 59.
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post-pill, post-Roe v. Wade15 world, choice has been deeply and
perhaps even irrevocably associated with a woman's right to
control her reproductive life and to procure both contraception and
abortion. In fact, so deep is this semantic connection that the term
"pro-choice" has become de facto shorthand for a political position
supporting abortion rights, just as "pro-life" has come to define the
opposing camp. And as reproductive options have expanded
beyond contraception and abortion to include the technologies of
assisted reproduction, the preference for choice has expanded as
well. Because if a woman has the right to prevent or end a
pregnancy, it seems obvious that she should also have the right to
produce a pregnancy. If she has a right to privacy (as established
in Griswold v. Connecticut16 in 1965) and a right to procreate (as
established in Skinner v. Oklahoma 7 in 1942), then surely she has
the right to procreate, through whatever means, in private. If the
right is absolute, then the technology, theoretically at least, does
not matter.
This Speech, however, aims to revisit the question of choice
in the context of assisted reproduction. The goal is not to attack
the current state of affairs, necessarily, or to provide a critique of
reproductive advances. Instead, it tries to probe what happens to
us, as individuals and society, as a woman's right to choose blurs
into a parent's right to select.
I. Background: The Evolution of Choice
Once upon a time, choice played no role in conception or
childbirth. Babies came as nature or the gods commanded, leaving
their parents, and particularly their mothers, with little
understanding of their creation and even less control over it.
Women's lives were defined by biology, by tradition, by the wants
and whims of others. But never, or nearly never, by choice.
It was not until the late nineteenth century that matters,
ever so slowly, began to change. As medical doctors gingerly
investigated the mechanics of reproduction, they came to
understand more precisely how it occurred and what might be
fixed when married couples (the only permissible subject of
inquiry) failed to reproduce. Gradually, for example, doctors and
researchers realized that men could be infertile as well as women
and that a wife's "barrenness" might therefore be cured by
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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inseminating her with sperm from another man.1 8 Quietly, then,
doctors began to treat infertility with artificial insemination, using
sperm donated by a relative of the husband or family friends. 19 By
the 1970s, as the practice became more widespread and less
covert, commercial sperm banks cropped up across the United
States, offering couples (or, in some cases, single women) the
chance to select specific sperm donors to father their offspring. 20
And thus the business of choice was born. One bank infamously
offered only the sperm of exceptional donors, including Nobel Prize
winners and Olympic athletes. 21 Others listed their wares by
reference to explicit genetic traits-blue eyes, for example, or red
hair, or a predilection for playing the cello. 22
Science and selection lurched forward again in 1978, with the
birth of Louise Brown, the world's first child to be conceived
through IVF.23 Although Louise and the thousands of "test tube
babies" that quickly followed in her wake were all the products of
their parents-the would-be mother's egg and the would-be
father's sperm mingled in a petri dish and transferred back to the
mother's womb-the technology of lVF eventually gave rise to the
prospect of donor eggs. If a prospective mother could be
stimulated to produce eggs for the petri dish, so, too, could a
completely unrelated woman. By the 1990s, a flourishing market
for donor eggs had emerged in the United States, matching young
women willing to undergo the fairly arduous process of egg
"donation" with other (usually older) women eager to conceive. 24
As was the case with sperm, eggs were identified by their donor's
genetic and physical characteristics: hair color, eye color, height,
and SAT scores. 25  Unlike sperm, however, eggs were also
frequently differentiated by price, with more "attractive"
characteristics (an Ivy League degree, for example, or varsity
sports talent) yielding prices as high as $50,000 per "harvest."26
Meanwhile, as the egg market was expanding in the 1990s,
researchers were also perfecting the technique and technologies of
PGD, learning how to identify genetic traits in even the earliest
18. See SPAR, supra note 7, at 18.
19. Id. at 36.
20. Id. at 35-36.
21. See generally DAVID PLOTZ, THE GENIUS FACTORY: THE CURIOUS HISTORY
OF THE NOBEL PRIZE SPERM BANK (2005) (explaining the genesis and workings of
the Nobel Prize Sperm Bank).
22. See SPAR, supra note 7, at 37.
23. Id. at 24.
24. See id. at 42-43.
25. See id. at 45-46.
26. Id.
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stage embryos. 27 Initially, PGD was seen and used almost solely
among families who were known to carry the genetic mutations for
devastating illnesses such as Fanconi anemia or Tay Sachs
disease. 28 By screening these couples' embryos after IVF and
choosing to transfer only those embryos without the mutation,
doctors could prevent parents from giving birth to a child who was
almost certain to die. It was essentially assisted reproduction as
high-tech prevention, stopping children from being born with
diseases rather than trying to cure them.
As the technology evolved, however, and became more widely
available, PGD rapidly revolutionized the biology of choice,
because once parents could choose against certain genetic
mutations, they could also select for others. Indeed, rather than
just selecting the genetic characteristics they wanted in a sperm or
egg donor, they could actually select the genes themselves. With
PGD, couples could now choose, as several did in tragic and highly-
publicized cases, to conceive a second child genetically matched to
save an already-dying sibling. 29 Or they could choose, on far more
trivial grounds, to produce a girl or a boy, with blonde hair or
brown. 30 The underlying science in all these instances was
essentially the same. As, arguably, was the moral question: how
much choice should parents have over the genetic make-up of their
children?
II. Bioethics: The Conundrum of Choice
As is often the case, debates over reproductive technologies
have largely been set by the philosophies and ideologies that
preceded them; by categories imported from related debates that
seem, on the surface at least, to offer some vague passage through
this brave new world.
The most obvious of these importations, as stated at the
outset, is the language of choice. Ever since the passage of Roe v.
Wade in 1973,31 a woman's control over her reproductive options
has been framed as a matter of choice-an incontrovertible "right
to choose" whether or not to bear a child. Indeed, so strong is the
27. See id. at 114-15.
28. See id. at 115.
29. See id. at 117-18.
30. See, e.g., id. at 121-22 (describing clinics that specifically offered to screen
for gender using PGD); William Saletan, Color ID: Screening Embryos for Eye,
Hair, and Skin Color, SLATE, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2211390
(discussing genetic tests for gender, eye color, hair color, and complexion that will
soon be available through the Fertility Institutes).
31. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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linguistic association that proponents of abortion rarely describe
themselves as such; instead, they are simply "pro-choice." And
opponents, wary perhaps of claiming to be "anti-choice," define
their cause in ways that still ring of unfettered free will: "pro-life"
or "choosing life."
When reproductive medicine burst into popular
consciousness, therefore, the language of choice was cast logically
upon it. Because if women could choose, as of 1973, not to give
birth to a child, how could they possibly be forbidden, as of 1978,
not to conceive? Yes, one could argue, as many early opponents of
IVF did, that medical intervention pushed choice beyond a
reasonable limit; but as IVF births rose throughout the 1980s and
1990s, 32 voices against it dropped into the background, leaving the
language of choice intact. Parents who turned to lVF were
actively choosing to build a family, using science to reinstate a
normal option that nature forgot. And as the technologies of
assisted reproduction expanded, so too did the logic that supported
them: single women could purchase sperm and choose to become
single moms; older women could choose to use younger eggs; gay
men could choose surrogate births; parents could choose to
undergo PGD to produce a healthy child. Or as Nadya Suleman,
the California mom of octuplets, put it: 'My family is complete
and I would not change anything."33 And if one believes-and the
law upholds-that all women have the right to control their own
reproduction, then Suleman's decision is perfectly justified.
On the other side, meanwhile, a concentrated but vocal band
of critics have long held that any active choice in reproduction is
inherently wrong-that it robs individuals of their humanity and
mistakenly privileges free will over life. 34
The most consistent voice among these nay-sayers is probably
the Catholic Church, which has steadfastly opposed any
intervention in or amendment to the natural process of
32. See generally Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Pregnancy, Body Part:
Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 195
(1997) (noting that between 1985 and 1991 IVF resulted in 11,260 clinical
pregnancies with 8,320 live births between 1990 and 1994).
33. John Ferguson, Octuplets Mum Speaks for First Time on IVF Family, DAILY
REC. (Glasgow), Feb. 14, 2009, at 7, available at http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk
news/uk-world-news/2009/02/14/octuplets-mum-speaks-for-first-time-on-ivf-family-
86908-21122359.
34. See, e.g., RONALD M. GREEN, BABIES BY DESIGN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC
CHOICE 109-11 (2007) (relating four major reasons why critics "believe that
expanded programs of prenatal genetic choice could harm both children and the
family"); SPAR, supra note 7, at 100, 118-19 (describing criticisms of using TVF and
PGD to manufacture and manipulate offspring).
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procreation. 35  Contraception, abortion, artificial insemination,
IVF, PGD-the Church has condemned them all, insisting in the
1992 Catechism of the Catholic Church that:
[Procreation by nontraditional means] . .. is no longer an act
by which two persons give themselves to one another, but one
that "entrusts the life and identity of the embryo into the
power of doctors and biologists and establishes the domination
of technology over the origin and destiny of the human person.
Such a relationship of domination is itself contrary to the
dignity and equality that must be common to parents and
children."
3 6
In this view, there is no slippery slope brought forth by expanding
technologies; instead, because the technologies themselves are
fundamentally flawed, one need never venture toward that slope
at all.
A more nuanced, but in some ways more problematic, view
comes from Michael Sandel, the eminent Harvard political
philosopher. Unlike the Catholic Church, Sandel condemns
neither abortion nor contraception; he firmly agrees with a
woman's right to choose. 37 What he objects to, however, is the
extension of choice into the realm of genetic selection. 38  No
parent, he argues, has the right to choose their child, even if that
choice involves health instead of sickness. 39 Because to choose a
child is to deny that child its dignity and give parents a mastery
that defies "the giftedness of life." 40  Or as he elaborates: "The
problem lies in the hubris of the designing parents, in their drive
to master the mystery of birth .... [I]t disfigures the relation of
parent and child, and deprives the parent of the humility and
enlarged human sympathies that an 'openness to the unbidden'
can cultivate."41 Similar concerns, though for different reasons,
have been voiced by critics such as Francis Fukuyama, who oppose
technologies of genetic selection, less for their inherent moral evils
than for their potential results. 42 According to Fukuyama, a world
of parental choice would inherently run the risk of genetic
35. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 89 (2002).
36. VATICAN, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 2377 (English ed.,
Libreria Editrice Vaticana 2000) (1992), available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a6.htm (footnotes omitted).






42. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 35, at 7.
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stratification, with wealthy parents electing to produce genetically
enhanced offspring and poorer ones left, eventually, at a
disadvantage. 43  "[W]hen the [genetic] lottery is replaced by
choice," Fukuyama writes, "we open up a new avenue along which
human beings can compete, one that threatens to increase the
disparity between the top and bottom of the social hierarchy."44
The two poles of genetic discussion, therefore, are sharply
defined and deeply opposed. On one side is choice: the ability of
all people, and particularly women, to control their own bodies and
reproductive preferences. On the other are nature and
consequence: a belief that procreation should never be interfered
with, and a fear of what interference-by either parents or the
state-might bring.
What rarely enters the debate, however, is the possibility
that reproductive choice could still exist in the context of
constraints; that, in other words, parents could maintain control
over their own bodies and choices without necessarily extending
those choices to include all aspects of their children. Currently, we
tend to assume that reproductive choice is indivisible: one either
has it or does not. Yet the field of reproduction can in fact be
divided into permissible and non-permissible behaviors; into
options that we as a society are comfortable endorsing and those
we are not. We do this already with regard to abortion-full
choice before the point of viability (usually between twenty-four
and twenty-eight weeks) and none after.45 We do it in the sphere
of parenting, where the State retains the right to deny parental
rights in the case of child abuse, 46 and with regard to marriage. 47
In these other realms, admittedly, the precise contours of state
policy are often contentious-witness ongoing debates about late-
43. Id. at 156-57.
44. Id. at 157.
45. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869, 872-75 (1992) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade's essential
holding recognizing a woman's right to choose an abortion before fetal viability,
while instituting the undue burden standard, rather than the trimester framework
adopted in Roe, as the standard for measuring the constitutionality of restrictions
on abortion before viability); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146, 161
(2007) (stating that an "undue burden" exists on a woman's right to terminate
pregnancy if a regulation's purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability, and that the
absence of a health exception in the abortion statute that was at issue did not
impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion).
46. See, e.g., Santonsky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 (1982) (discussing the
standard of proof required in parental rights termination proceedings).
47. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 281(a) (West 2008) (prohibiting bigamy, which
is described by the statute as any person already having a husband or wife
marrying any other person).
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term abortions 48 or gay marriage. 49 But the underlying authority,
the ability of the State to guide and even forbid some of life's most
intimate exchanges, is uncontested.
Already, other countries have extended elements of this
authority into the field of assisted reproduction. In Denmark, for
example, the State pays for three rounds of fertility treatment for
any woman needing them-but only three rounds, and only if the
woman is under the age of forty. 50 In the United Kingdom, doctors
are allowed to transfer no more than two embryos to a woman
younger than forty; 51 in Sweden, the law dictates that only one
embryo be transferred.5 2  Most countries in Europe ban
commercial surrogacy or the paid exchange of eggs.5 3
In the United States, by contrast, we remain stubbornly
reluctant to put any limits on a woman's right to choose or to allow
the State to intercede into the most intimate corners of decision-
making.5 4 Such reluctance is understandable, given both the level
of controversy regarding abortion in the United States and the
extent to which individual liberties are seen as trumping
communal interests. But we can draw lines in this particular plot
of sand without reversing Roe v. Wade or overly compromising an
individual's basic right to choose. And we should.
III. Balancing Acts: Who Chooses? Who Pays? Whose
Rights?
As a starting point, it is useful to consider the various parties
to assisted reproduction. The obvious ones are the prospective
parents, those who choose to have a child through an ever-
expanding array of options. They are the usual focus of moral
debate; the ones whose choice we are either eager to protect (A la
Roe v. Wade) or prohibit (as per the Catholic Church). Yet the
48. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Fourteenth Amendment Unenumerated Rights
Jurisprudence: An Essay in Response to Stenberg v. Carhart, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 815 (2001) (examining the right to privacy as a matter of substantive due
process and discussing the controversy surrounding post-fifteen week abortion).
49. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 7 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 181 (2005) (noting that the "debate over gay marriage has been
marred by bad arguments on both sides of the issue," and refuting the three worst
arguments against gay marriage).
50. SPAR, supra note 7, at 66.
51. Debora Spar, Taming the Wild West of Assisted Reproduction, COLUM.




54. SPAR, supra note 7, at 228.
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parents are not the only players in this realm. And by widening
our focus beyond them, we gain new perspective on the problem of
choice and new tools for drawing distinction.
Consider, first, the increasing overlap between private
procreational choices and society at large. When Ms. Suleman (the
now-infamous "octomom") decided to transfer multiple embryos
and carry a multiple pregnancy to term, she was making a private
decision. But her decision imposed not-insignificant costs-real,
financial costs-on those around her. Although no figures have
been released publicly, one normal Caesarean section usually costs
about $23,000;55 Suleman gave birth to eight babies and incurred
the additional cost of having forty-six doctors and nurses in the
room. 56 All of her children were premature, requiring stays in the
neonatal intensive care unit that probably cost roughly $165,000
per child. 57 If any of her babies grow into special needs children
(as statistically, they are likely to),5s her insurance company and
community will bear those costs as well. To be sure, insurance
companies and social welfare systems always bear the costs of
high-risk pregnancies and special needs children.5 9 When these
costs are the direct result of private choices, however, and
particularly of conscious choices to embrace expensive risks, then
it seems reasonable to give society some voice in the decision.
The second additional party to assisted reproduction is one
that rarely is given a say. And that, of course, is the child.
Because it is deeply ironic that in an area that is ostensibly all
about children-an area driven and dominated by the intense
pursuit of children-the child herself remains an object of desire
rather than the subject of free will. "Choice" here is always
conceived as belonging to the parents, rather than the child. This
focus is understandable; in any situation of assisted reproduction,
the child does not exist, so cannot by definition have a voice. And
insofar as one is imputed to her, it seems reasonable to assume
that the option of being born outweighs in all situations the
alternative. But as the menu of reproductive options expands, this
imputed choice has actually become far more nuanced. How might
a child choose between being a singleton baby and part of a brood
of eight? How might she feel about being blessed with consciously
blue eyes or a gender that fits her parents' preferences? Does the
55. Spar, supra note 51.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. SPAR, supra note 7, at 56, 229.
59. Id. at 229.
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child, who rapidly becomes an adult, after all, have a right to know
her genetic parentage, even if those parents (the sperm or egg
donor plus the social parents) explicitly chose not to reveal that
information?
In the field of adoption, the interests and rights of the child
are always taken as paramount: no would-be parent in the United
States can legally adopt a child without some outside authority (a
child welfare office, licensed adoption agency, or court) deeming
that the parent is fit and that the proposed adoption is in the best
interests of the child. 60 The system is far from perfect, and
arguably there are rights that adhere to an existing child that are
different from those of a not-yet-conceived one. The underlying
principle, however, could easily be extended into the realm of
assisted reproduction, even if only to scrutinize procedures that
are known to carry extensive risks to the child, such as high-
multiple pregnancies.
Conclusion
Drawing lines in the sand is rarely an easy or enjoyable
endeavor. It forces us to make distinctions that are rarely obvious,
and to sculpt what were once black-and-white debates into more
ambiguous shades of gray. In the area of reproduction, which
impinges simultaneously on our most intimate acts of personhood
and some of our most contentious tenets of public policy, lines will
be particularly tricky to establish and to uphold.
Yet the exercise itself is important. Because as we venture
further and further into the possibilities unlocked by assisted
reproduction, it is crucial that we not be locked into mindsets
forged in earlier eras and by other debates. Choice in assisted
reproduction is no longer only about whether to have a child, or
when. It is also now about what kind of child to create and what
kind of attributes a parent can impose upon her own offspring and
society at large. This expansion of choice changes the underlying
equation of reproduction and demands a different solution.
In particular, it demands that we consider choice not only as
an exercise of free will but also as an act of responsibility. When
parents choose an embryo to implant or a child to adopt; when
they select a blue-eyed egg donor or an anonymous sperm, they are
making decisions that have consequences-not only for
themselves, but for their children, their communities, and for a
society in which the very notion of parenthood is undergoing a
60. Id. at 161.
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quiet revolution. Technology has unleashed this revolution,
carrying in its wake an array of reproductive choices that were
literally inconceivable a generation ago. But the technological
expansion of choice need not entail the blind acceptance of all
choices. Instead, just as ancient societies eventually learned to
tame the primal forces of fire, we modern humans must seize
control over the expansion and refinement of our own fertility,
making choices that entail real decisions and learning,
occasionally, to say "no."
